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ABSTRACT 
 
This case presents a set of technical issues confronting the United States Treasury eCheck Pilot Project team in January 
2000. The team, which included representatives from the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Fleet Boston, 
Bank of America, and several hardware and software vendors, was testing a new Internet-based payment mechanism 
(eCheck). The system had already been tested for a year and a half with the participation of the two commercial banks (Fleet 
Boston, Bank of America), but this portion of the pilot was now coming to an end. During the first phase of the project, 
several key design choices had been made, including the use of smart cards to hold digital certificates, and specification of 
the information flows among the participants (payer, payee, payer bank, payee bank). Now, the system would need to be 
modified so that the U.S. Treasury could continue to make eCheck payments to a few defense contractors, with the help of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Two new designs are presented for evaluation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In January 2000, the United States Treasury eCheck Pilot 
Project team was planning the next phase of this test of a 
new electronic payment mechanism, which involved 
participation from the Treasury’s Financial Management 
Service, the U.S. Department of Defense Finance and 
Accounting Services Division, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston, and a few Defense suppliers. An earlier phase 
of the project had also involved two commercial banks, 
Fleet Boston and Bank of America, but this next phase 
would not include commercial banks. Thus it was 
necessary to redesign the payment flows. One solution 
had been suggested by Frank Jaffe, the outgoing manager of 
the eCheck Pilot Test. Another solution was suggested by 
Mike Versace, from the Federal Reserve Bank.  
 
Participants on the eCheck team–especially the represent-
ative from the U.S. Treasury Financial Management Service 
and Mike Versace from the Fed–needed to decide which of 
these two approaches to take.  
 
2. eCHECK PROJECT BACKGROUND 
 
eCheck was one of several projects initiated by the Financial 
Services Technology Consortium (FSTC), which consisted 
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of financial institutions, hardware and software firms, 
governmental agencies and others. The eCheck project, 
begun in spring 1994, was aimed at developing a new 
electronic payment mechanism for use in Internet 
commerce and other contexts. A Proof-of-Concept 
demonstration was held in 1995, and in 1996 a decision 
was made to conduct a pilot test at the United States 
Treasury (the decision was not announced until fall 
1997, after all parties signed project contracts). Much 
work was then done to flesh out the detailed 
specifications for ensuring secure transactions before the 
first eCheck was cut on June 30, 1998.  
 
This case describes the evolution of the eCheck design 
and technical specifications through winter 2000. A 
companion case (Gogan, Gelinas and Rao, 2003) 
addresses strategic and project management issues. 
 
3. PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
The pilot project was officially announced on October 7, 
1997. Participants (listed in Exhibit 1) had expected that 
the pilot test would involve 50 vendors, run for one year, 
and process up to 1,000 checks and $1 million per day. 
But before payments could be made, several important 
design issues had to be resolved. The next three sections 
of the case discuss each of these design challenges. 
 
4. SMART CARD DESIGN: A TOKEN CHOICE?  
 
Early on, security experts on the eCheck design team 
(such as Milt Anderson, a cryptography expert from 
Bellcore, Ken Goldman, a security researcher at IBM, 
Doug Kozlay, a founder of Information Resources 
Engineering (IRE), and Chuck Wade, a specialist in PKI 
services at BBN) urged the use of a separate “token” for 
storing cryptographic private keys (a “security token” is 
a simple hardware device, such as a smart card, key fob 
or small keypad, that is used in conjunction with another 
hardware device). A user would need to insert a special-
ly designed card or device into a reader on their 
computer, before an eCheck could be digitally signed 
and sent on to the payee. Milt Anderson explained: 
 
“In two-factor authentication, the user must have 
something–a token–and know something–a 
password. If I leave my laptop PC at the airport, 
I’ll have plenty to worry about, but my eCheck 
account will be safe. If my eCheck smart card 
falls into the wrong hands, that’s okay as long as 
the thief doesn’t know my password. If I care- 
lessly reveal my password, then the thief must 
obtain my smart card, which imposes one more 
security hurdle for the bad guys to surmount.” 
 
Some participants questioned the choice to store security 
keys on smart cards. Frank Jaffe, who represented Bank 
Boston and also served as overall eCheck project 
manager, argued in favor of a simpler approach: 
 
“Not all computers have PCMCIA slots, and I’m no 
longer convinced a token is necessary, from a 
business perspective. Another approach: store the 
key for the user’s digital signature in an encrypted 
file on their hard drive… This is not quite as secure 
as a smart card, but … it’s good enough. Most firms 
use firewalls to prevent unauthorized penetration. 
There is always a trade-off between perfect security 
and usability. Since it’s fairly unlikely that bad guys 
can obtain digital signature keys on a large scale, it’s 
more practical to establish just-in-case corrective 
procedures for the unlikely event keys are 
compromised.” 
 
Security experts on the team argued that the use of a 
hardware token is inherently more secure than a software 
solution. After much discussion the team chose to err on the 
side of caution and utilize a PCMCIA card. At the time 
(1995) the team was told that virtually all PCs would be 
equipped with PCMCIA slots by 1998. But as of 2000 few 
desktop models had a PCMCIA slot (an external PCMCIA 
device cost about $60), although most laptops did.  
Meanwhile, by 1997 an alternative token was gaining ground: 
the so-called “smart card,” which contains an embed-ded 
processor. Initially it was felt that smart cards were not 
powerful enough, but IRE and others on the team coded the 
necessary function-ality into a new generation smart card 
which was less expensive than a PCMCIA card (and, external 
smart-card readers cost only about $20). Team members 
agreed that a reasonable comp-romise between cost and 
security was achieved.  
 
5. HOW TO STUCTURE ECHECK DOCUMENTS? 
 
A markup language defines how information will be 
presented on an output device (such as a screen), and how 
portions of a document can serve as input to appli-cation 
programs. SGML (Standardized Generalized Markup 
Language) is a set of specifications for creating a markup 
language. HyperText Markup Language (HTML), used to 
display web documents, is defined by SGML.  In 1994 the 
eCheck designers evaluated the use of a markup language to 
structure eCheck documents. Some problems with extant 
markup languages were identified, especially when a 
necessary requirement was to digitally sign eChecks using 
public key cryptography. So, the team developed a new 
SGML-compatible mark-up language, for financial 
applications only, and eCheck in particular: Financial 
Services Markup Language (FSML). Milt Anderson noted: 
“The simplicity of FSML makes it compatible with the 
memory, process-sing, and interface speed limitations of 
smart cards.” FSTC published the specifications for FSML in 
fall 1998. That year, the World Wide Web Consortium 
approved Extensible Markup Language (XML) Version 1.0.  
XML meta-tags provide “information about infor-mation” 
(i.e., tags indicate what type of information is in the 
document), an approach that was similarly used in FSML. 
The general-ized use of meta-tags in XML made it possible 
to design a broad range of XML-compatible applications. 
Had XML already been an established protocol just two 
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years earlier, the eCheck team would surely have given it 
serious consideration (although FSML was a better fit for 
the eCheck application, having been custom designed for 
that purpose). By 2000, XML was a widely accepted 
industry standard. The eCheck team planned to re-write 
FSML as a subset of XML, but no deadline had been set. 
 
It is worth noting also that XML presented a significant 
technical hurdle for eCheck applications. Most markup 
languages inherit from SGML a limitation that is not 
found in other computer languages. Specifically, most 
markup languages define internal names (e.g., variables) 
as “global,” meaning that the same name must be unique 
throughout a document. When two documents are 
combined into a new document (not uncommon, and 
vital for the eCheck application), name collisions must 
be resolved by defining replacement names that will be 
unique in the combined document. If documents have 
been digitally signed, their names cannot be redefined, 
since any change to a document invalidates the signature 
(a useful feature if you don’t want someone modifying 
the amount field in an eCheck after it has been signed). 
This problem was resolved elegantly in FSML by 
defining name scoping rules (similar to how most 
computer languages work). An FSML name need be 
unique only within a subdocument that contains the 
name. Since XML lacks this feature, digitally signing 
XML documents was a significant challenge that 
required a few years of additional work. The FSTC 
provided requirements that provided a foundation for an 
IETF/W3C joint working group, known as XML DSig. 
 
6. FOUR CORNER ECHECK MODEL OR 
ECHECK LOCKBOX MODEL? 
 
A key design choice was determining how communica-
tion would take place between payer and payee. The 
eCheck team pioneered a method for using secure email 
transmissions for eCheck itself and for related remit-
tance information. Two processing models were 
evaluated. A “four-corner” model (Exhibit 2) was 
proposed in fall 1995; Treasury, the Fed, and Nations 
Bank approved this approach. Subsequently Frank Jaffe 
at Bank Boston advocated another approach. Instead of 
fully paralleling paper check processing (see Exhibit 3), 
Jaffe preferred to process eChecks in a manner similar to 
a lockbox (Exhibit 4). He argued vigorously in favor of 
the lockbox (Exhibit 5) approach, stating:  
 
“The [traditional] four-corner model is far and 
away the hardest one to implement, because all 
four parties–payer, payee, payee’s bank and 
payer’s bank–have to get equipped before you 
can flow your first transaction through.” 
 
The project manager at NationsBank, Steve Schutze, had 
a different point of view: 
 
“I see why you’re in favor of using a lock-box, 
Frank, because it’s easier. But with a lock-box 
you must convert the eCheck to ACH format and 
you give up a lot. You no longer have any of the 
attributes of a check when it gets posted to a 
recipient’s ac-count. If we’re going to call it a check, 
we should process it as a check.” 
 
Treasury and the Fed agreed with Steve Schutze that the 
Pilot should test the peer-to-peer capabilities of eCheck (with 
an eCheck being directly sent to the recipient, just like a 
paper check).  This choice meant that the NationsBank 
eCheck server would need to be able to encapsulate eChecks 
into a check image format (using X9.46, a standard that 
governs the electronic exchange of digital images of checks). 
 
Mike Versace preferred that eCheck utilize the Federal 
Reserve Bank’s existing systems and network infra-structure 
as much as possible (much of which was only recently 
deployed). The Fed’s server would also apply digital 
signatures and certifi-cates. In order to submit payments for 
clearing through the existing Electronic Check Presentment 
(ECP) system, the Fed’s server would “wrap” each eCheck 
“image” in a secure enclosure (using another standard, 
X9.37, which specifies how to enclose payment data for 
clearing). 
 
The U.S. Treasury wanted Treasury check law to apply to 
the eCheck and this would not be the case with the lockbox 
model. So, they too wanted eCheck to behave like a paper 
check and be processed like a paper check. They wanted the 
trial to test a “peer-to-peer” model of payment, which is 
comparable to traditional paper check flows (i.e., an eCheck 
is delivered directly to the payee, who logs its receipt and 
then deposits it at their bank).1
 
Once participants agreed to use the traditional “around the 
outside” four-corner processing model, it was possible to 
complete the necessary server software. On June 30, 1998, 
Treasury cut the first eCheck, for $32,135.97 to pay GTE for 
work on a Defense Department contract. The check was 
cleared through the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and 
deposited into GTE’s account at BankBoston. 
 
7. MEDIATED Z-FLOW OR INTERNET PAYMENT 
SERVICE MEDIATOR? 
 
BankBoston and NationsBank committed to participate in a 
12-month pilot (Fall 1997 – Fall 1998). In fall 1998 
NationsBank merged with Bank of America, but Bank of 
America agreed to an extension of the pilot (as did 
BankBoston). In fall 1999 BankBoston was acquired by 
Fleet Bank. Bank of America then announced that they 
would withdraw from the pilot in spring 2000. Since the pilot 
design required participation of two commercial banks, Fleet 
                                                 
1 If eCheck were used for other than Treasury checks, Uniform 
Commercial Code sections 3 and 4 (check law) would apply only if 
eChecks were processed in the same manner as paper checks, and 
not converted to other payment systems (such as ACH, which is 
governed by different laws and industry rules). 
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Bank had to withdraw from the pilot.2 By then, Fleet had 
decided to spin off its eCheck interest into a new 
venture, Clareon. Frank Jaffe decided to join Clareon, so 
he would soon leave the eCheck team).  
 
For the next phase of the Treasury Pilot, the team needed 
to determine how to replace Bank of America and Fleet 
as the vendors’ (payees’) banks. After some ideas were 
discussed, Mike Versace at the Fed offered to have 
vendors deposit their eChecks at the Fed, which would 
then clear them through the Automated Clearing House 
(see http://nacha.org/About/what_is_ach_.htm); He 
explained (see Exhibit 6): 
 
“Defense Department vendors will still receive 
eChecks from Treasury. But with this new flow, 
vendors will send their eChecks to the Fed. We 
will then convert the eChecks to ACH credits to 
transfer the funds from Treasury to the vendor.”  
 
Versace added that the systems at the Fed would “figure 
out where to send the money through the use of an 
intelligent interface to the ACH network.” He was quite 
enthusiastic about this approach:  
 
“This clearinghouse model represents a different 
way of thinking for the Fed. It puts us in a new 
intermediary position–between vendors and their 
banks. And, it gives us the opportunity to learn 
more and extend our support for the Treasury.” 
 
Before making a final decision, the team asked Frank 
Jaffe for his opinion. Jaffe liked the idea. He replied:  
 
“So, the Fed will become an originator of ACH 
credits rather than clearing the payment as a 
check. This approach is a better model for the 
eCheck. The [traditional] four-corner model 
should be dumped. It was done as a technology 
proof-of-concept, but as a business model 
implementation it’s the hardest way to go about 
doing this and getting adoption, because too 
many different parties need to be enabled.”  
“Still,” he added, “one could go even further.” Jaffe laid 
out yet another way to design the information flows (see 
Exhibit 7), using a central Internet Payment Service: 
 
“The right way to get adoption is to have a 
processing service–be it a bank or not–to do just-
in-time application delivery. This would be a 
service, not a technology or a software solu-tion. 
There would be no customer-side install, and no 
                                                 
2 Another significant change was pending: FSTC signed a 
memo of understanding to transfer the eCheck technology to 
CommerceNet (another consortium) in January 2000. The 
arrangement was never fully consummated, and FSTC later re-
established its stewardship of eCheck. 
 
special software at the bank. The service would 
provide a raw ACH file to the bank.” 
 
Jaffe’s design eliminated the need to install special server 
software at participating banks, so he believed that bankers 
would be enthusiastic about trying this new payment service. 
Jaffe would also revisit the decision to use two-factor token-
based authentication in this scenario. “I’d issue passwords to 
users and design plenty of security into the central service,” 
he explained. “I would not require users to insert a card into 
a slot every time they want to make a payment.” 
 
With the rapidly approaching withdrawal of Fleet and Bank 
of America), in January 2000 it was time to decide on a new 
processing flow. As they considered the merits of Frank 
Jaffe’s Internet payment service versus the Fed’s Z-Flow 
proposal, team members recalled that Milt Anderson (the 
security expert from Bellcore) believed that an electronic 
check could serve a greater variety of transaction types and 
trading partners, more conven-iently and at a lower cost, than 
any other payment mechanism. At the 1995 proof-of-concept 
demonstration he had said (Gelinas and Gogan, 1997): 
 
“eCheck is a message that tells existing demand 
deposit accounting systems to do credits and debits 
against existing systems. Encrypted digital signatures 
will authenticate banks and customer accounts. The 
code for producing and validating digital signatures 
will reside on customers’ eCheckbooks (tokens), and 
banks’ eCheck servers. Because an online 
intermediary won’t be required to complete a 
transaction, processing costs will be lower than 
secure credit-cards or network money systems.” 
 
By January 2000 $3 million in payments had been issued in 
the eCheck pilot; the largest single payment had been for 
$230,000.  The team considered: which of the two designs 
best matches the intent of the original designers? More 
importantly, which design represents the best solution as 
eCheck moves out of the Treasury Pilot and on to 
commercialization? 
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Exhibit 1 
eCheck United States Treasury Pilot Participants 
 
Participant Role 
BBN (GTE 
Internetworking) 
Provide certificate authority software and hardware, plus high-assurance cryptographic 
hardware used by Treasury to sign eChecks. Chuck Wade initially managed BBN’s 
part of the project.  
BankBoston (later 
Fleet Boston) and 
NationsBank (later 
Bank of America) 
Depository banks for the Department of Defense vendors. Heretofore, Frank Jaffe 
managed the overall eCheck project, while also managing Bank Boston’s part of the 
project. NationsBank’s part of the project was managed by Steve Schutze. 
Federal Reserve 
Banks of Boston 
and Richmond 
Clearing bank for U. S. Treasury. Mike Versace, who headed the Emerging Payment 
System Group in the Fed’s Retail Payments Office, managed the Fed’s part of the 
project, including end-to-end system testing (with participation by the Dallas Federal 
Reserve).  
IBM, with Agorics Develop eCheck servers for BankBoston and NationsBank, to accept eChecks via 
email and then process them through existing systems. 
Information 
Resources 
Engineering (IRE): 
Develop smart-card technology and integrate with RDM software. 
IntraNet Develop software for converting eCheck data to X9.46 standard3
RDM Corporation Develop eCheck servers for Treasury and software for payees (Defense Department 
suppliers) to receive eChecks and submit eCheck data to their own accounting systems. 
Sun Microsystems Develop the eCheck servers for the Federal Reserve Bank 
U. S. Dep’t. of 
Defense Finance 
and Accounting 
Services Division 
Actual provider of payments to Defense suppliers (by longstanding government policy, 
Defense made its own payments, in contrast to most federal agencies, whose payments 
are made by Treasury, although in this pilot, Treasury did act as the payments agent for 
Defense). 
 
                                                 
3 In fall 1999 X9.46, was amended by ECCHO to include the eCheck image. X9.46 is a standard for electronic exchange of digital images 
of checks. This format was used for submission of eChecks to the Fed in Phase I of the pilot. At the Fed this image was enclosed in an 
X9.37 format for clearing. The X9B group of the Accredited Standards Committee, Inc. X9—Financial Services—agreed to add the 
definition of eCheck to the X9.37 Electronic Check Exchange Standard. 
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Exhibit 2 
eCheck Processing: The Four-Corner Model 
 
NOTE: Model used when the first eCheck was issued in June 1998
eCheck (with payment advice)
[via Internet]
Payment
advice
Indorsed
eCheck
[via Internet]
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
Traditional check clearing
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
Payer Payee
Payer's
bank
Payee's
Bank
Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)
1
2a
2b
3b
3a4b
1. Payer (the U. S. Treasury) sends a digitally-signed eCheck (including certificates representing
the payer and their bank), along with payment advice data such as the supplier's (the payee's)
invoice number and amount paid.
2a. Payee's (DoD suppliers such as GTE) eCheck processing system strips off the payment advice
data and forwards it to its internal accounting system.
2b. Payee's eCheck processing system indorses the eCheck (by digitally signing the eCheck using
the payee's certificate issued to them by the bank), digitally signs the entire message and forwards
it to their bank (either BankBoston or NationsBank).
3a. Payee bank's eCheck processing system sends the deposit to the Demand Deposit Acount
(DDA) system where the payee's account is credited and from which the payee is notified on
their next statement.
3b. Payee bank's eCheck processing system encapsulates the eCheck into X9.46 formatted records
(Financial Image Exchange) and sends it to the Fed for clearing.
4a. The Fed encloses the eCheck into an X9.37 format (Electronic Cash letter/Electronic Check
Exchange) for clearing via Electronic Check Presentment (ECP) system. Being handled now like an
electronic representation of a paper check, the Fed credits the payee bank's account and debits the
payer bank's account. The eCheck is then forwarded to the payer's bank (in the pilot, also the Fed).
4b. Acting now as the Treasury's bank, the Fed debits the Treasury's account and sends a file of
payments to the Treasury where they reconcile the eChecks that they wrote with those that
cleared at the Fed.
4a
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Exhibit 3 
Paper Check Processing Model 
Check (with payment advice) Paymentadvice
Endorsed
Check
Payment settled by FED
Statement
Payer Payee
Payer's
bank Any Bank
Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)
 
Exhibit 4 
Lockbox Processing Model 
Check (with payment advice)
[mailed to payee PO box (the lockbox)]
Payment
advice
Payment advice
[usually electronic]
Traditional check clearing
Payer Payee
Payer's
bank
Payee's
Bank
Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts
Statement
1. Payer sends a paper check along with a paper payment (remittance) advice, such as a
payment stub from an invoice, to the payee's PO box (the lockbox processing center operated
by the payee's bank). The lockbox processing may be performed by a value-added network
(VAN).
2a. Payee bank enters the payment advice and check data into their computer system and
forwards the payment advice data to the payee. Copies of the payment advice documentation
might be sent to the payee via courier or scanned and faxed.
2b. Payee bank sends the check to the payer's bank for processing.
3. Payee sends the payment advice data to their internal accounting systems.
4a. The Fed processes the check by crediting the account for the payee's bank and debiting
the account for the payer's bank.
4b. The payer's bank debits the payer's account and notifies the payer, via their next
statement, that a deposit has been made
1
3
2a
2b4a
4b
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Exhibit 5 
eCheck Processing: The Lockbox Model 
Note: Proposed, but not used in the pilot
echeck (with payment advice)
[via Internet]
Payment
advice
Payment settled by the Fed
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
US Treasury
(payer) Payee
Federal
Reserve Bank
(payer's bank)
Payee's
Bank
Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)
Payment
advice
1. Payer (e.g., the U. S. Treasury) sends a digitally-signed eCheck (including certificates representing
the payer and their bank), along with payment advice data such as the supplier's (the payee's)
invoice number and amount paid to the electronic lockbox operated by the payee's bank.
2a. In the payee bank's (either BankBoston or NationsBank) electronic lockbox, the eCheck
processing system strips off the payment advice data and forwards it to the payee.
The deposit data is sent to the Demand Deposit (DDA) system where the payee's account is credited.
2b. Payee bank's eCheck processing system prepares and sends to the Fed either an ACH debit,
an eCheck for clearing through the traditional check clearing and settlement system, or a wire transfer.
3. Payee sends the payment advice data to their internal accounting systems.
4a. The Fed processes the ACH debit, eCheck, or wire transfer by crediting the account for the payee's
bank and debiting the account for the payer's bank. In this model the Fed is the payer's bank.
4b. Acting now as the Treasury's bank, the Fed debits the Treasury's account and sends a file
of payments to the Treasury where they reconcile the eChecks that they wrote with those that
cleared at the Fed.
1
2a
2b
3
4b
4a
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Exhibit 6 
eCheck Processing: The Z-flow Model Proposed by the Fed 
Note: Proposed by Fed for phase 2 of the pilot
eCheck (with payment advice)
[via Internet]
Payment
advice
Endorsed
eCheck
[via Internet]
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
Credit push to Payee's Account
[via ACH (operated by Fed)]
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
US Treasury
(payer) Payee
Federal
Reserve Bank
(payer's bank)
Payee's
Bank
Internal systems
(e.g., cash receipts)
1. Payer (the U. S. Treasury) sends a digitally-signed eCheck (including certificates representing
the payer and their bank), along with payment advice data such as the supplier's (the payee's)
invoice number and amount paid.
2a. Payee's eCheck processing system strips off the payment advice data and forwards it to
the payee's internal accounting system.
2b. Payee's eCheck processing system endorses the eCheck (by digitally signing the eCheck
using the payee's certificate issued to them by their bank), digitally signs the entire message and
forwards it to the payer's bank (the Fed).
3a. The payer's bank (the Fed) originates an ACH credit that is sent to the payee's bank via the
ACH network.
3b. Acting as Treasury's bank, the Fed debits Treasury's account and sends a file of
payments to Treasury, which reconciles the eChecks that they wrote with those that
cleared at the Fed.
4. Payee's bank credits the payee's account and notifies the payee on their next statement.
1
2b
2a
3a
3b
4
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Exhibit 7 
Mediated Flow Model Proposed by Frank Jaffe 
Payer Payee
IPS
Payer's
Bank
Payee's
Bank
IPS' bank
Payment
[via web with SSL]
Notice of payment
[via e-mail]
ACH debit ACH credit
NOTE: Internet Payment Service (IPS) Model proposed by Frank Jaffe for phase 2 of the pilot
Miscellaneous
communications
[via e-mail]
Miscellaneous
communications
[via e-mail]
Payment advice
[via web with SSL]
1
2
3
4a 4b
5
1. Payer, using a Java applet that is delivered on demand by the IPS, makes a payment via the
IPS web site. The session is secured by SSL and the payments are signed with a digital signature.
The signing key is stored in an encrypted file on the payer's hard drive.
2. The IPS sends an e-mail to the payee notifying them of the payment.
3. The IPS notifies their bank of the payment.
4a. The IPS' bank generates an ACH debit. The Fed debits the payer bank's account at the Fed
and sends the debit on to the payer's bank. The payer's bank debits the payer's account and
notifies them via the regular bank statement.
4b. The IPS' bank generates an ACH credit. The Fed credits the payee bank's account at the
Fed and sends the credit on to the payee's bank. The payee's bank credits the payee's account
and notifies them via the regular bank statement.
5. The payee may obtain, via an SSL-secured web session, payment details that can be read
directly into their accounting applications.
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
4a
Confirmation
(e.g., statement)
4b
 
 
 269
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Systems & Computing 
Academic Professionals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATEMENT OF PEER REVIEW INTEGRITY 
 
All papers published in the Journal of Information Systems Education have undergone rigorous peer review. This includes an 
initial editor screening and double-blind refereeing by three or more expert referees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright ©2003 by the Information Systems & Computing Academic Professionals, Inc. (ISCAP). Permission to make digital 
or hard copies of all or part of this journal for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made 
or distributed for profit or commercial use. All copies must bear this notice and full citation. Permission from the Editor is 
required to post to servers, redistribute to lists, or utilize in a for-profit or commercial use. Permission requests should be sent to 
the Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Information Systems Education, editor@jise.org. 
 
ISSN 1055-3096 
